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A Summary of Statutory and Case Law Associated With
Contracting in the Electronic Universe
John M. Norwood*
I. INTRODUCTION
Contracting in the electronic universe, practically non-existent ten
years ago, is now common practice. In response to a need for cer-
tainty regarding the particulars relating to such agreements, three dif-
ferent "codes" have been developed: the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"), a the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act ("UETA"), 2 and the Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act ("E-sign"). 3 The first two are state law
based, and the third is governed by federal law. This paper describes
the essential elements of all three codes. Following is a summary of
recent judicial decisions involving electronic contracting. Surprisingly,
none of the cases involved an application of any of the three Codes.
They were all decided on the basis of general principles of common
law, or Article Two (Sales) of the Uniform Commercial Code. 4
Hence, these are discussed separately at the end of the paper.
II. UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT5
UCITA, described by its authors as "a commercial contract code for
the computer information transactions," is the product of years of ef-
fort by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.6 It was intended as an amendment to the Uniform Commercial
Code, but was eventually introduced as a document to be considered
independent of the Code. It is stated in the prefatory note that "Arti-
cle Two served as both a model and a point of departure for
* Associate Professor, Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas; Distin-
guished Adjunct Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law.
1. UNIF. COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSAcrIONs AcT [hereinafter UCITA] §§ 101-905
(2002).
2. UNIF. ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONs Acr [hereinafter UETA] §§ 1-21 (1999).
3. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act [hereinafter E-sign], 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 7001-7903 (2005).
4. U.C.C. §§ 2-101 to 2-725 (2005).
5. http://www.ucitaonline.com
6. UCITA pref. note (2002).
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UCITA. ' '7 It is a rather lengthy document: the articles plus the com-
ments print out to over 280 pages. To date, UCITA has proven to be a
tough sell, having been adopted only by Maryland and Virginia.8
However, some of its provisions have been replicated in the other ma-
jor acts described in this paper (UETA and E-Sign), and so a review
of the major provisions of the act is included here.
A. Scope
Section 103 provides that "this Act applies to computer information
transactions."9 The Comment provides further clarification:
This Act deals with contracts and not property law. It applies to
computer information transactions. In a computer information
transaction, the transferee seeks the information and contractual
rights to use it. Unlike a buyer of goods, a purchaser (e.g., buyer,
lessee, or licensee) of computer information has little interest in the
diskette or tape that originally contained the information after that
information has been loaded into a computer. 10
The Comment goes on to indicate that the scope of the Act "turns
initially on the definition of 'computer information transaction.""'
Quoting from Section 102, the Comment notes that "'[c]omputer in-
formation transactions' are agreements that deal with the creation,
modification, access to, license, or distribution of computer
information."12
The Comment also states that "the mere fact that communications
about a transaction, such as an application for a loan or employment,
are sent or recorded in digital form does not place the transaction
within this Act."'1 3 Hence, a contract entered into via electronic com-
munications would not fall under the Act for that reason alone; the
bargain itself would have to deal with the exchange of rights to com-
puter information.
As indicated by the Comment, the Act does apply to contracts to
create, develop, or modify software and computer information.14 Ac-
cording to the Comment, "the Act covers all software /development
contracts, thus resolving conflicts in prior case law."' 5
7. Id.
8. Id. refs. & annots.
9. Id. § 103.
10. Id. § 103 cmt. 2 (2002) (emphasis added).
11. Id.
12. UCITA §103 cmt 2 (2002).
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id. § 103 cmt. 2a.
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B. Opt-in or Opt-out
Section 104 gives the parties the option to agree that the Act does
apply, or does not apply, to a given transaction. 16 This Section as-
sumes that a material part of the subject matter deals with computer
information. The caveat is that in mass-market transactions, any term
which changes the extent to which the Act applies must be
conspicuous. 17
C. Relation of Act to Other Laws
Section 105 provides that "a provision of this Act which is pre-
empted by federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the preemp-
tion." 18 Also, there is a clause at the end of Section 105 providing
that: "the following laws govern in the case of a conflict between this
Act and the other law. .. "19 At this point an individual state could
indicate which laws would come ahead of UCITA. As explained in
the Comment, this section "allows States with existing laws regarding
digital signature, electronic signatures, and other similar statutes,
which attribute acts or performance of a party in computer informa-
tion transactions, to list any provisions of such statutes that the State
desires to have prevail over this Act in the case of a conflict. '20 The
Comment goes on to note that "it is not necessary to list UETA be-
cause, by its terms, that Act does not apply if UCITA applies." 21
D. Electronic Records and Authentication
Section 107 contains the mandate that "a record or authentication
may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in
electronic form."' 22 In Section 102 the term "authenticate" is defined
as: "(A) To sign; or (B) With the intent to sign a record, otherwise to
execute or adopt an electronic symbol, sound, message, or process re-
ferring to, attached to, included in, or logically associated or linked
with that record." 23
The Comment to Section 102 provides further insight as to what is
encompassed by this definition:
16. Id. § 104.
17. UCITA § 104(c) (2002).
18. Id. § 105.
19. Id. § 105(e).
20. Id. § 105 cmt. 6.
21. Id.
22. UCITA § 107(a) (2002).
23. Id. § 102.
20061
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Authenticate: This term replaces "signature" and "signed." A simi-
lar change in terminology is made in UCC Article Nine. In this Act,
the term "sign" has the meaning used in UCC Sec. 1-201, except
that it is not limited to authenticating a writing. The definition is
technologically neutral. The definition makes clear that qualifying
electronic systems fulfill former paper-based requirements. This is
consistent with the policies of the federal Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act which precludes discrimination
against electronic records and signatures solely because they are
electronic in character. Any "signature" under other law is an au-
thentication under this Act. In addition, authentication includes
qualifying use of any identifier, such as a personal identification
number (PIN) or a typed or otherwise signed name. It can include
actions or sounds such as encryption, voice and biological identifica-
tion, and other technologically enabled acts if done with proper
intent.24
In some cases authentication may have been accomplished by an
"electronic agent." Section 102 defines this term to mean "a com-
puter program, or electronic or other automated means, used inde-
pendently to initiate an action, or to respond to electronic messages or
performances, on the person's behalf without review or action by an
individual at the time of the action or response to the message or per-
formance. '25 With regards to such agents, Section 107 provides that
"a person that uses an electronic agent that it has selected for making
an authentication, performance, or agreement, including manifesta-
tion of assent, is bound by the operations of the electronic agent, even
if no individual was aware of or reviewed the agent's operations or the
results of the operations. '2 6 The Comment explains that actions of an
electronic agent generally bind the principal, but only in those situa-
tions where the principal selected the agent.27 The Comment also in-
dicates that "the electronic agent must be operating within its
intended purpose. For human agents, this is often described as acting
within the scope of authority. Here, the focus is on whether the agent
was used for the relevant purpose. '28
E. Manifesting Assent
One of the most important sections in the Act is Section 112. This
section describes what constitutes "assent" as follows:
24. Id. § 102 cmt. 4.
25. Id. § 102(a)(27).
26. Id. § 107(d).
27. UCITA § 107 cmt. 5 (2002).
28. Id.
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(a) A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person,
acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review
the record or term or a copy of it:
(1) authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt or ac-
cept it; or
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with
reason to know that the other party or its electronic agent may
infer from the conduct or statement that the person assents to
the record or term.
(b) An electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if, after
having an opportunity to review it, the electronic agent:
(1) authenticates the record or term; or
(2) engages in operations that in the circumstances indicate ac-
ceptance of the record or term.29
The expression "opportunity to review" is further explained later in
the article. It is stated that:
With respect to opportunity to review, the following rules apply:
1) A person has an opportunity to review a record or term only if it
is made available in a manner that ought to call it to the attention of
a reasonable person and permit review.
2) An electronic agent has an opportunity to review a record or
term only if it is made available in a manner that would enable a
reasonably configured electronic agent to react to the record or
term.
30
The Comment provides additional guidance as to what would con-
stitute the manifestation of assent. The Comment describes "assent
by conduct" as occurring when a "person acts or fails to act having
reason to know its behavior will be viewed by the other party as indi-
cating assent."' 31 This section goes on to state the well known com-
mon law doctrine that assent is to be judged not subjectively, but
rather by an objective indicia of assent.32 It also specifically notes that
the reason to know standard "is not met if the computer information
is sent to a recipient unsolicited under terms that purport to create a
binding contract by failure to object to the unsolicited sending. '33
The Comment also provides guidance as to what would constitute
assent by an "electronic agent," According to the Comment:
Assent may occur through automated systems ("electronic
agents")... For electronic agents, assent cannot be based on knowl-
edge or reason to know, since computer programs are capable of
neither and the automated nature of the interaction may mean that
no individual is aware of it... Assent occurs if the agent's opera-
29. Id. § 112.
30. Id. § 112(e)(5) (2005).
31. Id. § 112 cmt. 3b.
32. UCITA § 112 cmt. 3b (2002).
33. Id.
2006]
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tions were an authentication or if, in the circumstances, the opera-
tions indicate assent. In this Act, manifesting assent requires a prior
opportunity to review. For an electronic agent, this opportunity oc-
curs only if the record or term was presented in such a way that a
reasonably configured electronic agent could react to it.3 4
The Comment also mentions that the use of "double assent" proce-
dures, although not required, is encouraged. 35 Hence, if it is made
clear that the assenting party has an opportunity to confirm or deny
assent before proceeding, confirmation will meet the requirement of
the section.
The illustrations given in the Comment provide further guidance as
to what constitutes assent under UCITA. In one hypothetical, a regis-
tration screen prominently states:
Please read the License. It contains important terms about your use
and our obligations. If you agree to the license, indicate this by
clicking the "I agree" button. If you do not agree, click "I decline."
The on-screen buttons are clearly identified. The underlined text is
a hypertext link that, if selected, promptly displays the license. A
party that indicates "I agree" assents to the license and adopts its
terms.
36
The second illustration given by the Comment involves an online
stock quote service which includes in small print the notation "terms
and conditions of service; disclaimers." The customer's attention is
not called to the sentence, and no reaction to it is mandated. Accord-
ing to the Comment, while there is a contract for the service provided,
there may be no agreement to the terms of the service and the
disclaimer.37
Finally, the Comment reinforces the necessity of a party having the
opportunity to review a document before a manifestation of assent
can occur. According to the Comment "A manifestation of assent to a
record or term under this Act cannot occur unless there was an oppor-
tunity to review the record or term. Common law does not clearly
establish this requirement, but the requirement of an opportunity to
review terms reasonably made available reflects simple fairness. '38
Further guidance as to what is required of a licensor with regard to
providing an opportunity to review is indicated in Section 211. The
section states that:
34. Id. § 112 cmt. 3c.
35. Id. § 112 cmt. 5.
36. Id. § 112 illus. 1.
37. UCITA § 112 illus. 2 (2002).
38. Id. § 112 cmt. 2.
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A licensor affords an opportunity to review the terms of a standard
form license which opportunity satisfies Section 112(e) with respect
to a licensee that acquires the information from that site, if the
licensor:
1) makes the standard terms of the license readily available for
review by the licensee. . . by: displaying prominently and in
close proximity to a description of the computer information,
or to instructions or steps for acquiring it, the standard terms or
a reference to an electronic location from which they can be
readily obtained. 39
F. Variation by Agreement
Taking its cue from Sec. 1-102 of the UCC, Section 113 of UCITA
provides that the effect of the provisions of the Act can be varied by
agreement.40 However, obligations of good faith, diligence, reasona-
bleness, and the like cannot be disclaimed.41 Unlike Article One of
the UCC, there is a detailed list of articles establishing specific rules
which cannot be varied by agreement, except insofar as is allowed by
the specific article in question. This includes such topics as: choice of
law, choice of forum, requirements for manifesting assent and oppor-
tunity for review, limitations on mass-marketing licenses, and limita-
tions on self help provisions. 42
G. Statute of Frauds
The magic number for UCITA is $5,000. Section 201 provides that
contracts requiring payment of that amount or more are not enforcea-
ble by way of action or defense, unless:
1) The party against whom enforcement is sought has authenticated
a record which reasonably identifies the copy or subject matter; or
2) The agreement is a license for a duration of one year or less, or
which may be terminated at will by the party against which the con-
tract is asserted. 43
This second part is new to UCITA. The effect is that for a license a
record is required only if the dollar amount is $5,000 or more, AND
the license grant is for more than one year. A license agreement
which is agreed to be "perpetual" would be construed as more than
one year and (if for more than $5,000) would have to be in writing.
On the other hand, an agreement which can be cancelled at-will would
be considered to be less than one year.
39. Id. § 112.
40. Id. § 113.
41. Id. § 113.
42. UCITA § 113 (2002).
43. Id. § 201.
2006]
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Like Article Two, there is an exception as to a contract which in-
volves a performance tendered by one party and accepted by the
other, and also an exception as to admissions in court. Also, the "con-
firming letter doctrine" is retained in UCITA, with the change that
the person receiving the confirming letter must object within a "rea-
sonable time" (as opposed to ten days under Article Two).
H. Offer and Acceptance
Section 203 establishes the basic rules of when an offer and accept-
ance result in a binding agreement between the parties. Perhaps the
most interesting aspect of this section is the statement that:
if an offer in an electronic message evokes an electronic message
accepting the offer, a contract is formed:
a) when an electronic acceptance is received; or
b) if the response consists of beginning performance, full per-
formance, or giving access to information, when the perform-
ance is received or the access is enabled and necessary access
materials are received. 44
Hence, the famous mailbox rule is rejected by this section in favor
of a "time of receipt" rule. There remains the issue of defining "re-
ceipt." According to Section 102(52), "receipt" means:
(A) with respect to a copy, taking delivery; or
(B) with respect to a notice: 1) coming to a person's attention; or
2) being delivered to and available at a location or system desig-
nated by agreement for that purpose, or, in the absence of an
agreed location or system...:
II) In the case of an electronic notice, coming into existence in an
information processing system or at an address in that system in a
form capable of being processed by or perceived from a system of
that type by a recipient, if the recipient uses, or otherwise has desig-
nated or holds out, that place or system for receipt of notices of the
kind to be given and the sender does not know that the notice can-
not be accessed from that place. 45
The Comment notes that under traditional common law, "arrival at
an appropriate private post office box is receipt even if the addressee
does not remove or read the message until later.46 Similarly, arrival at
an appropriate electronic mail address is receipt by the addressee.4 7
The definition is met by arrival at a location only if the person holds
44. Id.
45. Id. § 102(52).
46. Id. §102 cmt. 47.
47. UCITA § 102 CMT. 47 (2002).
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out that location or system as a place for receiving notices of the
kind. 4 8
Section 214 reinforces this concept. It provides that "receipt of an
electronic message is effective when received even if no individual is
aware of its receipt. ' 49 According to the Comment, "this time of re-
ceipt rule reflects both the relatively instantaneous nature of elec-
tronic messaging and places the risk on the sending party if receipt
does not occur... The message is effective when received, not when
read or reviewed by the recipient, just as written notice is received
even if not read or acknowledged. '50
I. Offer and Acceptance by Electronic Agents
Section 206 involves the formation of contracts through the opera-
tion of electronic agents. UCITA recognizes this means of contracting
as resulting in an enforceable bargain, but allows a court to grant ap-
propriate relief "if the operations resulted from fraud, electronic mis-
take, or the like." 51 The Comment provides further guidance as to the
meaning of this component of the section:
Assent does not occur if the operations are induced by mistake,
fraud or the like, such as where a party or its electronic agent
manipulates the programming or response of the other electronic
agent in a manner akin to fraud... Similarly, the inference is viti-
ated if, because of aberrant programming or through an unexpected
interaction of the two agents, operations indicating existence of a
contract occur in circumstances that are not within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties. Such circumstances are analogous to
mutual mistake.52
J. Determining Attribution
According to Section 102, an "attribution procedure means a proce-
dure to verify that an electronic authentication, display, message, re-
cord, or performance is that of a particular person or to detect
changes or errors in information. '53 The term includes a procedure
that requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words
or numbers, encryption, or callback or other acknowledgment. 54 Sec-
tion 212 deals with determining attribution. According to the Com-
48. Id.
49. Id. §214(a).
50. Id. § 214 cmt. 2.
51. Id. § 206(a).
52. UCITA § 206 cmt. 3 (2002).
53. Id. § 102(a)(5).
54. Id.
2006]
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ment, "attribution to a person means that the electronic event is
treated in law as having come from that person. ' 55 The article itself
provides that "an electronic authentication, display, message, record,
or performance is attributed to a person if it was the act of the person
or its electronic agent, or if the person is bound by it under agency or
other law."' 56 The party relying on attribution has the burden of
proof. 57
K. Electronic Error
Section 213 describes what constitutes "electronic error." This re-
fers to "an error in an electronic message created by a consumer using
an information processing system if a reasonable method to detect
and correct or avoid the error was not provided. '5 8 According to the
Comment, "this section creates a statutory electronic error correction
procedure for consumers that supplements common law concepts of
mistake. ' 59 The section goes on to provide that:
in an automated transaction, a consumer is not bound by an elec-
tronic message that the consumer did not intend and which was
caused by an electronic error, if the consumer:
(1) promptly on learning of the error: (a) notifies the other
party of the error; and (b) causes delivery to the other party or,
pursuant to reasonable instructions received from the other
party, delivers to another person or destroys all copies of the
information; and
(2) has not used, or received any benefit or value from, the
information or caused the information or benefit to be made
available to a third party.60
The Comment provides an example of the kind of mistake encom-
passed by this section. The Comment states that:
a consumer's mistake in erroneously entering "11" as the number of
copies desired may be an error, but does not come within this sec-
tion if the automated ordering system with which the consumer in-
teracts requires confirmation of the quantity and reasonably allows
the consumer to correct any error before sending the order. The
rule thus provides an incentive to establish error-correction proce-
dures in automated contracting systems and provides protection to
the consumer where such procedures are not present.61
55. Id. § 212 cmt. 1.
56. Id. § 212(a).
57. UCITA § 212(a) (2002).
58. Id. § 213(a) (emphasis added).
59. Id. cmt. 1.
60. Id. § 213(b).
61. Id. § 213 cmt. 2 (2002).
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The Comment provides two contrasting illustrations. Illustration
One involves the facts described above: the consumer intends to or-
der one game from seller's web site, but inadvertently types "11." '62
The seller delivers the games either electronically or by courier. The
consumer then notices his mistake, and promptly notifies the seller,
offering to return the items (at his own expense) and does not use the
games. Under these conditions, there is no obligation for the eleven
games.63 However, assume that the seller's system asks consumer to
confirm an order of eleven copies, and consumer confirms.64 "There
is no electronic error. The procedure reasonably allowed for correc-
tion of the error. The conditions for application of this section are not
met. ' 65 Note that Section 213 only applies if the seller did not provide
to the consumer "a reasonable method to detect and correct or avoid
the error."'66
L. Satisfaction
Under common law, a contract to be performed to another party's
"satisfaction" might be subject to either an objective or subjective
standard, depending upon the circumstances. According to Section
308, an objective standard is the norm in UCITA. The article
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), an agreement that
provides that the performance of one party is to be to the satisfac-
tion or approval of the other party requires performance sufficient
to satisfy a reasonable person in the position of the party that must
be satisfied.
The "subjective" standard is to apply in the following
circumstances:
(1) the agreement expressly so provides, such as by stating that ap-
proval is in the "sole discretion" of the party, or words of similar
import; or
(2) the agreement is for informational content to be evaluated in
reference to subjective characteristics such as aesthetics, appeal,
suitability to taste, or subjective quality. 67
According to the Comment, "subsection (b)(2) presumes a subjec-
tive standard if the contract involves informational content evaluated
on aesthetics, appeal, or the like... As the subsection makes clear, this
refers to cases where evaluation reflects subjective criteria and judg-
62. UCITA § 213 illus. 1 (2002).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 213 illus. 3.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 213(a).
67. UCITA § 308(a) (2002).
2006]
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ment. A reasonable person standard in such cases is nonsensical since
the nature of the required evaluation presumes the exercise of per-
sonal judgment. '68
M. Implied Warranties
Section 403 contains language similar to that of UCC Sec. 2-314.
Under this section a licensor provides an implied warranty that the
computer program is "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
computer programs are used."' 69 There is a note that this section does
not result in an implied warranty as to informational content, although
such a warranty might arise under Section 404. 70 The Comment indi-
cates that "merchantability does not require a perfect program, but
only that the subject matter be generally within the average standards
applicable in commerce for programs having the particular type of
use. The presence of some defects may be consistent with
merchantability standards."'71
1. Content
Section 404 deals with warranties of informational content made by
a person in a special relationship of reliance with a licensee. It might
be compared to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose under UCC Sec. 2-315. It basically provides that a person in a
position of reliance with a licensee regarding the collection or compi-
lation of informational content "warrants to that licensee that there is
no inaccuracy in the informational content caused by the merchant's
failure to perform with reasonable care."' 72 A "strict liability" stan-
dard is thus rejected by UCITA. The Comment indicates that "the
requirement of a special relationship of reliance is fundamental to bal-
ancing protecting client expectations while not imposing excessive lia-
bility risk on informational content providers. '73
2. Disclaimer
Section 406 allows merchants to disclaim implied warranties in a
manner similar to UCC Sec. 2-316. To disclaim the implied warranty
under Section 403, the language must mention "merchantability" or
"quality" or use words of similar import, and if in a record, must be
68. Id. § 308 cmt. 3.
69. Id. § 403(a)(1).
70. Id. 403(c).
71. Id. § 403 cmt. 3a.
72. UCITA § 404(a) (2002).
73. Id. §404 cmt. 3a.
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conspicuous. To disclaim the implied warranty arising under Section
404, the language must mention "accuracy" or use a term of similar
import. The expression "as is" is also recognized as disclaiming all
implied warranties except those arising under Section 401 (warranty
of noninterference and noninfringement).
N. Transfer of Contractual Interest
Section 503 is probably the most controversial of the UCITA provi-
sions. It basically provides that in most cases "a term prohibiting
transfer of a party's contractual interest is enforceable, and a transfer
made in violation of that term is a breach of contract and is ineffective
to create a contractual right in the transferee against the non-transfer-
ring party. ' 74 It does stipulate that "a term that prohibits transfer of a
contractual interest under a mass-market license by the licensee must
be conspicuous." 75 The Comment makes it clear that a prohibited
transfer is completely ineffective, rather than merely a breach (as
would be the case under common law).76 The illustration given by the
Comment is as follows:
Assume a license for $5,000 that allows Small Licensee (a five em-
ployee company) to make "as many copies as needed for use in li-
censee's business;" the license is expressly not transferable. Small
Licensee transfers the license to AT&T, a company with 300,000
employees. If the transfer is merely a breach, AT&T may be per-
mitted to make as many copies as it needs for 300,000 employees
until licensor learns of the breach and cancels the license against
Small Licensee. The rule making the transfer ineffective preserves
the original bargain. 77
Professor Ferrera, et al., provide an illustration of how these restric-
tions on transfer might operate to the disadvantage of consumers.
The illustration used is the following:
Suppose that you buy a new computer from an online vendor, such
as Dell Computer Corp. or Gateway, Inc. - one that comes fully
loaded with operating system software, desktop software, office
software, games, and everything else that you need to do whatever
you do. Suppose, a year later that you want to sell the computer
and buy a new one. You look at the licenses you signed for the
software installed on the computer. Assume that all of them con-
spicuously forbid the transfer of the installed software to any third
74. Id. § 503(2).
75. Id. § 503(4).
76. Id. § 503 cmt. 5.
77. UCITA § 503 illus. (2002).
2006]
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party. If the UCITA applies, and you want to legally sell your com-
puter, you will have to strip off all of the software on the machine.
78
0. Performance
Section 601 provides that a "party shall perform in a manner that
conforms to the contract. '7 9 The section requires a "material" breach
before the other party is discharged. 80 The "perfect tender rule" of
UCC Sec. 2-601 is not incorporated into this section. According to the
Comment:
subsection (b) follows the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
common law. It adopts the standard of material breach for deter-
mining the nature of the remedies available for breach by the other
party. The concept of material breach is applied throughout con-
tract law and has been relied on by courts for generations. It holds
that a minor defect in performance does not warrant rejection or
cancellation of a contract: the remedy lies in recovery of damages.
81
Section 701 provides further guidance as what would constitute a
"material" breach. It states that a breach of contract is material if:
1) The contract so provides, or
2) The breach is a substantial failure to perform a term that is an
essential element of the agreement, or
3) The circumstances, including the language of the agreement, the
reasonable expectations of the parties, the standards and practices
of the business, trade, or industry, and the character of the breach
indicate that:
a) the breach caused or is likely to cause substantial harm to the
aggrieved party, or
b) the breach substantially deprived or is likely substantially to de-
prive the aggrieved party of a significant benefit it reasonably ex-
pected under the contract.8 2
P. Cure
Section 703 permits a party in breach of contract to "cure" an other-
wise non-conforming performance, similar to UCC Sec. 2-508. The
Comment indicates that "cure is not an excuse for faulty performance,
but rather an opportunity to avoid loss and retain the benefits of the
contract for both parties. Cure does not eliminate a right to damages,
but prevents cancellation based on the cured breach. '83
78. FERRERA ET AL., CYBERLAW: TEXT AND CASES 118 (1st ed. 2000).
79. UCITA § 601(a) (2002).
80. Id. § 601(b).
81. Id. § 601 cmt. 3.
82. Id. § 701(c).
83. Id. § 703 cmt. 3.
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Q. Revocation of Acceptance
Section 707 is similar to UCC 2-608. Under this section:
a party that accepts a nonconforming tender of a copy may revoke
acceptance only if the nonconformity is a material breach of con-
tract and the party accepted it:
(1) on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity
would be cured, and the nonconformity was not seasonably
cured;
(2) during a continuing effort by the party in breach at adjust-
ment and cure, and the breach was not seasonably cured; or
(3) without discovery of the nonconformity, if acceptance was
reasonably induced either by the other party's assurances or by
the difficulty of discovery before acceptance. 84
As under Article Two, revocation of acceptance is precluded if the
victim does not take action within a reasonable time after discovery of
the nonconformity.
R. Measure of Damages
Section 807 prohibits the recovery of consequential damages in
most cases. It also prohibits the recovery of damages that are specula-
tive in nature. The illustration given by the Comment is as follows:
D distributes stock market information through newspapers and on-
line for $5 per hour or $1 per copy. C reviews the online informa-
tion and trades 1 million shares of Acme at a price that causes a $10
million loss because the data were incorrect... this is published in-
formational content, and C cannot recover alleged consequential
loss.8 5
III. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS AC- 8 6
UETA is also a product of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws. Unlike UCITA, it was never intended to
be considered by the states as part of the UCC. The purposes of the
Act were stated in the preface:
[T]he purpose of the UETA is to remove barriers to electronic com-
merce by validating and effectuating electronic records and signa-
tures. It is NOT a general contracting statute - the substantive rules
of contracts remain unaffected by UETA. Nor is it a digital signa-
ture statute. To the extent that a State has a Digital
84. UCITA § 707(a) (2002).
85. Id. § 807 illus. 1.
86. http://www.ncsl.org/programslis/cip/ueta.htm
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Signature Law, the UETA is designed to support and compliment
that statute.87 UETA is a much more modest project than UCITA. It
prints out at less than sixty pages. It has also proven to be more popu-
lar among the state legislatures; to date, it has been adopted by the
legislatures of forty states plus the District of Columbia.88
A. Scope
Section 3 of the Act indicates that the act applies to "electronic
records and electronic signatures relating to a transaction." 89 Section
2 provides that "electronic record means a record created, generated,
sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means." 90 An
electronic signature is "an electronic sound, symbol, or process at-
tached to or logically associated with a record and executed or
adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record." 91
The Comment clearly indicates that a "signature" might include
such things as one's voice on an answering machine, one's name in an
E-mail, a firm's name on a facsimile document, a mouse click on a
web page, or a digital signature using public key encryption technol-
ogy.92 The key element is intent.93 According to the comment, "it
also may be shown that the requisite intent was not present and ac-
cordingly the symbol, sound or process did not amount to a signa-
ture... The definition requires that the signer execute or adopt the
sound, symbol, or process with the intent to sign the record. '94
Section 3 stipulates that certain kinds of transactions are not gov-
erned by the Act. This includes wills and trusts. 95 It also includes the
UCC, except for Article Two (Sales). 96 If the state has adopted
UCITA, then that Act controls over UETA.97 The Comment makes
note of the fact that it may be important to differentiate between the
legality of an electronic document between parties, and the legal obli-
gations owed to third parties. For example, the Comment states that
whereas an electronic document might suffice for purposes of entering
87. UETA pref. note (1999).
88. The only states which have not adopted UETA are: Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
89. UETA § 3(a) (1999).
90. Id. § 2(7).
91. Id. § 2(8).
92. Id. § 2 cmt. 6.
93. See id. § 2 cmt. 7.
94. UETA § 2 cmt. 7 (1999).
95. Id. § 3(b)(1).
96. Id. § 3(b)(2).
97. Id. § 3(b)(3).
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into a contract involving real estate, a more traditional document
might be needed for purposes of recordation. 98
B. Necessity of Agreement
Section 5 states that the Act "applies only to transactions between
parties each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic
means. Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by elec-
tronic means is determined from the context and surrounding circum-
stances, including the parties' conduct." 99 The Comment provides the
following examples of circumstances from which it may be found that
the parties have agreed to conduct their transactions electronically:
EXAMPLE 1: Joe gives out his business card with his business E-
mail address. It may be inferred that Joe has agreed to communi-
cate electronically for business (not personal) purposes.100
EXAMPLE 2: Sally has several E-mail address (home, business,
non-profit organization).
It is reasonable to infer that Sally is willing to communicate elec-
tronically with regards to the activity associated with each E-mail
address. It would NOT be reasonable to assume that an electronic
communication with Sally unrelated to the individual E-mail ad-
dress was authorized. 10 1
EXAMPLE 3: At a business meeting one tells the other to send an
E-mail to confirm a transaction. The requisite agreement to be
bound electronically has been demonstrated.
EXAMPLE 4: Buyer executes a standard form contract in which an
agreement to receive all notices electronically is included in the
midst of other fine print. Buyer has never communicated with
Seller electronically. This does NOT indicate a willingness to deal
electronically. According to the Comment, "nothing in this Act
prevents courts from policing such form contracts under common
law doctrines relating to contract formation, unconscionability, and
the like.' 02
C. Legal Recognition of Electronic Records
Section 7 establishes the basic rule of UETA - that electronic
records and signatures are to be given equal status to traditional writ-
ten documents. The Article provides that:
(a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforce-
ability solely because it is in electronic form...
98. Id. § 3 cmt. 7.
99. UETA § 5(b) (1999).
100. Id. § 5 cmt. 4B.
101. Id. § 5 cmt. 4C.
102. Id. § 5 cmt. 5B.
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(c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record
satisfies the law.
(d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the
law. 103
According to the Comment, "this section sets forth the fundamental
premise of this Act: namely, that the medium in which a record, signa-
ture, or contract is created, presented or retained does not affect its
legal significance. '' 10 4 The Comment gives an illustration involving
the purchase of widgets via an exchange of E-mails for a price in ex-
cess of $500.105 The Comment states that "the transaction may not be
denied legal effect solely because there is not a pen and ink 'writing'
or 'signature.' "106
D. Attribution
Section 9 deals with "attribution," a term which is not specifically
defined in the Act. It relates to authority to contract. The section
provides that:
(a) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a
person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be
shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any
security procedure applied to determine the person to which the
electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.
(b) The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attrib-
uted to a person under subsection (a) is determined from the con-
text and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation,
execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and
otherwise as provided by law.10 7
According to the Comment, this Article "does not alter existing
rules of law regarding attribution. The section assures that such I ales
will be applied in the electronic environment. A person's actions in-
clude actions taken by human agents of the person, as well as actions
taken by an electronic agent.' 08 The Comment goes on to give exam-
ples of situations in which attribution would have taken place:
EXAMPLE 1: A person types his/her name as part of an E-mail
purchase order. 10 9
Example 2: The person's employee, with authority to do so, types
the person's name as part of an E-mail purchase. 10
103. Id. § 7.
104. UETA § 7 cmt. 1 (1999).
105. Id. § 7 cmt. 3.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 109.
108. Id. § 109 cmt. 1.
109. UETA § 109 cmt. 1A (1999).
110. Id. § 109 cmt. lB.
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EXAMPLE 3: "The person's computer, programmed to order
goods upon receipt of inventory information within particular pa-
rameters, issues a purchase order which includes the person's name
or other identifying information." '111
The Comment then goes on to address the subject of the use of
facsimile machines. It states that a facsimile may be attributed to a
person as a result of information printed across the top of the page
that indicates the machine from which it was sent.112 With regards to
whether such a document would satisfy a "signature" requirement, the
Comment states:
Some cases have held that the letterhead actually constituted a sig-
nature because it was a symbol adopted by the sender with intent to
authenticate the facsimile. However, the signature determination
resulted from the necessary finding of intention in that case. Other
cases have found facsimile letterheads NOT to be signatures be-
cause the requisite intention was not present. The critical point is
that with or without a signature, information within the electronic
record may well suffice to provide the facts resulting in attribution
of an electronic record to a particular party.113
It would appear that the Comment is taking a neutral position on
the issue of whether or not a facsimile is a "signature." In the case of
Parma Tile Mosaic and Marble Co., Inc. v. Estate of Short,114 a New
York court held that the automatic imprinting of a company's name
on a facsimile did not satisfy the requirement that a contract be "sub-
scribed" under New York's statute of frauds. 1" 5
E. Effect of Change or Error
Section 10 deals with issues associated with errors made via elec-
tronic contracting. According to part (2):
In an automated transaction involving an individual, the individual
may avoid the effect of an electronic record that resulted from an
error made by the individual in dealing with the electronic agent of
another person if the electronic agent did not provide an opportu-
nity for the prevention or correction of the error and, at the time
the individual learns of the error, the individual:
A) Promptly notifies the other person of the error and that the indi-
vidual did not intend to be bound by the electronic record received
by the other person;
B) Takes reasonable steps, including steps that conform to the other
person's reasonable instructions, to return to the other person, or if
111. Id. § 109 cmt. 1C.
112. Id. § 109 cmt. 3.
113. Id.
114. 663 N.E.2d 633 (1996).
115. Id. at 527-28.
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instructed by the other person, to destroy the consideration re-
ceived, if any, as a result of the erroneous electronic record; and
C) Has not used or received any benefit or value from the consider-
ation, if any, received from the other person. 116
The Comment notes that this section encourages the party acting
through the electronic agent (normally the merchant) to build into the
system a mechanism enabling the other party to detect and correct
errors before they are sent to the merchant. According to the
Comment:
For example, the electronic agent may be programmed to provide a
"confirmation screen" to the individual setting forth all the informa-
tion the individual initially approved. This would provide the indi-
vidual with the ability to prevent the erroneous record from ever
being sent. Similarly, the electronic agent might receive the record
sent by the individual and then send back a confirmation which the
individual must again accept before the transaction is completed.
This would allow for correction of an erroneous record. In either
case, the electronic agent would "provide an opportunity for pre-
vention or correction of the error, and the subsection would not ap-
ply. Rather the affect of any error is governed by other law. 117
Thus, if the person using the electronic agent (usually the merchant)
provides the other party an opportunity to correct the record and the
other party does not do so, this section of the Act does not apply, and
the other party would have to seek a remedy under general principles
of common law. If no opportunity to correct was provided, then the
other party may avoid the bargain by promptly notifying the merchant
and returning (or destroying) the items received under the contract.
This is similar to the rule set forth in Section 214 of UCITA (elec-
tronic errors).
F. Retention of Electronic Records
Section 12 provides that "if a law requires that a record be retained,
the requirement is satisfied by retaining an electronic record of the
information."' 18 This rule is consistent with the theme of the Act that
electronic records are to be given the same effect as traditional written
documents. Section 13 continues this theme by stipulating that "in a
proceeding, evidence of a record or signature may not be excluded
solely because it is in electronic form."" 9
116. UETA § 10 (1999).
117. Id. § 10 cmt. 5.
118. Id. § 12(a).
119. Id. § 13.
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G. Automated Transactions
Section 14 deals with the increasing use of automated methods of
contracting. It provides that "a contract may be formed by the inter-
action of electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was
aware of or reviewed the electronic agents' actions or the resulting
terms and agreements."' 120 The Comment notes that "contracts can be
formed by machines functioning as electronic agents for parties to a
transaction. It negates any claim that lack of human intent, at the
time of contract formation, prevents contract formation."'121
H. Time and Place of Sending and Receipt
Section 15 outlines specific rules as to when an electronic message is
considered to be "sent" and "received." However, the Section does
not take a position on whether an acceptance is considered to be valid
when mailed (the "mailbox rule"). Presumably, general principles of
common law will still apply, to the effect that in most cases accept-
ances are valid when mailed. The Section provides that an electronic
record is sent when it:
(1) is addressed properly or otherwise directed properly to an infor-
mation processing system that the recipient has designated or uses
for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information of the
type sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the elec-
tronic record;
(2) is in a form capable of being processed by that system; and
(3) enters an information processing system outside the control of
the sender or of a person that sent the electronic record on behalf of
the sender or enters a region of the information processing system
designated or used by the recipient which is under the control of the
recipient.122
As indicated in the Comment, "the critical element when more than
one system is involved is the loss of control by the sender."'1 23 Once
the message leaves the system of the party in question, it is considered
"sent." This is the electronic equivalent of a person dropping a letter
in the mailbox. The Comment points out that the second portion of
part (3) is intended to address those situations when both parties are
using the same server (such as two professors at the same university).
120. Id. § 14(1).
121. For additional information regarding automated means of contracting, see the Data In-
terchange Standards Association home page at www.x12.org
122. UETA § 15 (1999).
123. Id. § 15 cmt. 2.
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In such a case, "to qualify as a sending, the e-mail must arrive at a
point where the recipient has control."'1 24
The Section goes on to address the issue of "received." It states
that an item is "received" when:
(1) it enters an information processing system that the recipient has
designated or uses for the purposes of receiving electronic records
or information of the type sent and from which the recipient is able
to retrieve the electronic record. . . An electronic record is re-
ceived... even if no individual is aware of its receipt.125
The Comment elaborates upon this last portion of the Section. Ac-
cording to the Comment, the Section "makes clear that receipt is not
dependent on a person having notice that the record is in the person's
system. Receipt occurs when the record reaches the designated sys-
tem whether or not the recipient ever retrieves the record. The paper
analog is the recipient who never reads a mail notice. ' 126 The Com-
ment further explains the significance of the requirement that the re-
cipient must have designated or used the particular processing system
for the purpose of receiving the kind of messages involved in that par-
ticular transaction. The example given by the Comment is as follows:
[T]he recipient retains the ability to designate a home e-mail for
personal matters, work e-mail for official business, or a separate or-
ganizational e-mail solely for the business purposes of that organiza-
tion. If A sends B a notice at his home which relates to business, it
may not be deemed received if B designated his business address as
the sole address for business purposes . .127
I. Transferable Record
Section 16 permits a negotiable instrument under Article Three of
the Uniform Commercial Code to be in electronic form. A person
having control of such a record would be considered a "holder" under
the UCC, and could qualify as a holder in due course. 128 According to
the Comment, "this section provides legal support for the creation,
transferability and enforceability of electronic note and document
equivalents." 129
124. Id.
125. Id. § 15(3)(b).
126. Id. § 15 cmt. 5.
127. UETA § 15 cmt. 3 (1999).
128. Id. § 16(6)(d).
129. Id. § 16 cmt. 1.
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IV. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL
COMMERCE ACT
1 30
Signed into law by President Clinton in 2000, E-Sign gives elec-
tronic signatures and contracts the same validity as traditional written
documents. It applies only in those states which have not adopted
UETA. Unlike UETA and UCITA it does not contain "comments,"
making it somewhat more difficult to predict its intended application
to specific situations. At only seventeen printed pages, E-Sign is con-
siderably shorter than UETA and is less comprehensive than that doc-
ument. The definitions of terms used in the Act are consistent with
UETA. This includes:
Electronic agent: "a computer program or an electronic or other au-
tomated means used independently to initiate an action or respond
to electronic records or performances in whole or in part without
review or action by an individual..."131
Electronic record: "a contract or other record created, generated,
sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.' 32
Electronic signature: "an electronic sound, symbol, or process, at-
tached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the
record." 133
A. General Rule of Validity
Section 7001(a) provides that it is limited to transactions "affecting
interstate commerce.' 34 It indicates that: "(1) A signature, contract,
or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form. ' 135
The Section goes on to state that the Act does not "require any person
to agree to use or accept electronic signatures.' 36 Hence, a person
could easily prevent himself from being subject to electronic contracts
by simply stating that such agreements were not to be recognized.
However, notwithstanding this provision of the law, the Act goes on
to indicate that if a statute or regulation requires information to be
provided to a consumer in writing, the use of an electronic record to
provide the information would be acceptable, provided the consumer
130. 15 U.S.C. 7001 (2005)
131. E-sign, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(3) (2005).
132. Id. § 7006(4).
133. Id. § 7006(5).
134. This is of course mandated by Article I, Sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives
Congress the right "to regulate Commerce... among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl, 3.
135. E-sign, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a)(1) (2005).
136. Id. § 7001(b)(2).
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agreed to such use and had not withdrawn consent. 137 It is also re-
quired that the consumer be notified of the hardware and software
requirements for access to and retention of the electronic records. 138
The Act also provides numerous details regarding preservation of
consumer rights.139 Finally, the Act indicates that "an oral communi-
cation or a recording of an oral communication shall not qualify as an
electronic record for purposes of this subsection."' 140 This would pre-
vent an audio recording from substituting for a written agreement
where such an agreement was required by law.
The Act also provides that notarization can occur electronically, 141
that the Act applies to insurance contracts, 142 and that electronic
agents are recognized.1 43 This portion of the Act reads as follows:
A contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, va-
lidity, or enforceability solely because its formation, creation, or de-
livery involved the action of one or more electronic agents so long
as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to
the person to be bound. 144
1. Exemption to Preemption
Section 7002 provides that a state may supersede the provisions of
the Act by enacting UETA.145 Alternative procedures or require-
ments are also permitted; provided they are not inconsistent with the
general principle of E-Sign, which is to give recognition to electronic
records and signatures. 46
2. Specific Exceptions
Section 7003 provides that certain kinds of arrangements are not
covered by the Act. This includes: wills, trusts, adoptions, divorces,
court orders or notices, and a few others. 147 Also specifically excepted
137. Id.. § 7001(c)(1) (2005). The Act also states that the consumer must have been provided
with a clear and conspicuous statement informing the consumer of a right to have the notice
provided in nonelectronic form. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B).
138. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(i).
139. See E-sign, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c) (2005).
140. Id. § 7001(c)(6).
141. Id. § 7001(g).
142. Id. § 7001(i).
143. Id. § 7001(h).
144. E-sign, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(d) (2005).
145. Id. § 7002(a). "As approved and recommended for enactment in all the States by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999 ..." Id.
146. See id. § 7002(a)(2).
147. Id. § 7003.
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is any transaction governed by the UCC.148 However, Articles Two
(Sales) and Two A (Leases) are subject to E-sign. Also, under Section
7021 a person "having control of a transferable record is the holder, as
defined in section 1-201 (20) of the UCC, of the transferable record
and has the same rights and defenses as a holder of an equivalent
record or writing under the UCC.' '149
B. Reported Cases Involving Electronic Contracting
Most of the reported cases involving electronic contracting relate to
the question of whether contractual terms initially presented to the
consumer in either "shrinkwrap" or "clickwrap" format should be en-
forceable. Some of the cases involve the issue of limitation of liability;
whereas others involve a forum selection clause or arbitration clause.
While most of the reported decisions have upheld the validity of such
agreements, a few have held to the contrary. Those courts which have
refused to enforce a shrinkwrap/clickwrap agreement have relied pri-
marily on UCC Sec. 2-207 (battle of the forms), holding that the seller
and buyer entered into a contract prior to the time the shrinkwrap/
clickwrap terms were made available to the buyer. Those terms thus
became proposals for additions to the contract, and since they were
material changes did not become a part of the bargain.
In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, Inc.,15° the
purchaser of computer software brought suit against the seller for
breach of warranty. 151 The seller defended on the basis of a dis-
claimer of warranties and limitation of remedies that appeared on the
shrinkwrap packaging. 152 The court held that the agreement between
the parties was created as a result of telephone conversations,
purchase orders, and invoices, none of which made reference to dis-
claimers. 53 Since the disclaimer appeared only on the "box top" after
the goods were delivered, these terms could not be part of the original
agreement between the parties. 54 At best these constituted a propo-
sal for an addition to the contract under UCC Sec. 2-207.155 "Because
the warranty disclaimer and limitation of remedies terms would mate-
148. Id. § 7003(a)(3).
149. E-sign, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7021(d) (2005).
150. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
151. Id. at 93.
152. Id. at 94-95.
153. Id. at 96.
154. Id. at 105-06.
155. Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 105-06.
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rially alter the parties' agreement, these terms did not become a part
of the parties' agreement."'1 56
In Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.,157 the pur-
chaser received and used an evaluative copy of the software. 158 The
materials contained a shrinkwrap license similar to that of the previ-
ous case. 159 The purchaser admitted that he read the license agree-
ment, but thought that it was unenforceable since he had allegedly
received specific representations from the seller's representatives. 160
The buyer made many purchases from the seller over the next year.16'
These were normally done via a phone call, with the goods being
shipped together with invoices. 162 Neither party made reference to
the disclaimers, which were included only in the shrinkwrap. 63 The
court held that the parties had in fact entered into numerous separate
contracts (one for each purchase). a64 The court agreed with the seller
that the first purchase was subject to the disclaimers, since the buyer
had reviewed the evaluative disk as well as the disclaimers. 165
In essence, the contract was formed at the time the buyer agreed to
retain the materials, which occurred after the disclaimer was
known.166 However, the other purchases resulted in contracts at the
time of the agreement between the parties (usually over the tele-
phone), and the disclaimers only came later. 167 According to the
court:
[b]y agreeing to ship the goods, or at the latest, by shipping the
goods, [the seller] entered into a contract with [the buyer].... The
license agreement thus is best seen as a proposal to modify the con-
tract between the parties, which, as the court has discussed, was not
effective because [the buyer] never specifically assented to the pro-
posed terms.168
Hence, they constituted proposals for additions to the contract, and
since they were material they would become part of the bargain only
if specifically agreed to by the buyer. Since this did not occur, the
disclaimers were not part of the bargain.
156. Id. at 106.
157. 831 F.Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).




162. Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F.Supp. at 764.
163. Id. at 761.
164. Id. at 763.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F.Supp. at 763.
168. Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
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Perhaps the most widely cited shrinkwrap case, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg & Silken Mtn. Web Services, Inc.,169 the Seventh Circuit
held that a shrinkwrap license included with software was binding
upon a buyer.170 This particular contractual provision was printed
hard copy in the box, on the CD-ROM disks, and appeared on a user's
screen every time the software ran.171 In this particular case it limited
the use of the product to non-commercial purposes. 172 The buyer al-
legedly violated this provision of the contract, and the seller sued.
The trial judge issued a ruling in favor of the buyer, employing the
reasoning of the two cases previously discussed (UCC 2-207). 173
However, the Court of Appeals reversed.174 Basing its decision on
both common law as well as the U.C.C., 75 the court held the restric-
tion enforceable. The court stated that "transactions in which the ex-
change of money precedes the communication of detailed terms are
common. ' 176 A comparison was made to the sale of insurance,
wherein the consumer pays first, and receives the details of the policy
at a later date. 177 Another comparison was to the purchase of a radio,
where the box contains the terms of the warranty. 178 The court stated
its view that "so far as we are aware no state disregards warranties
furnished with consumer products."'1 79 It then relied on UCC Sec. 2-
204, which indicates that parties may contract for the sale of goods "in
any manner sufficient to show agreement."'180
Llan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp.'81 involved a clas-
sic shrinkwrap/clickwrap issue, and is colorfully described by the court
in the first paragraph of the decision:
Has this happened to you? You plunk down a pretty penny for the
latest and greatest software, speed back to your computer, tear
open the box, shove the CD-ROM into the computer, click on 'in-
stall' and, after scrolling past a license agreement which would take
at least fifteen minutes to read, find yourself staring at the following
dialog box: 'I agree.' Do you click on the box? You probably do
169. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
170. See id. at 1449.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1448.
174. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448.
175. Id. at 1450. "Whether there are legal differences between 'contracts' and 'licenses'
(which may matter under the copyright doctrine of first sale) is a subject for another day." Id.
176. Id. at 1451.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
180. Id. at 1452.
181. 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002).
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not agree in your heart of hearts, but you click anyway, not about to
let some pesky legalese delay the moment for which you've been
waiting. Is that 'clickwrap' license agreement enforceable? Yes, at
least in the case described below. 182
This case actually involved a license agreement between two
merchants. 183 The purchaser of the software was acquiring rights to
the seller's software, and in turn it would rent the software to custom-
ers.184 The issue centered on whether the purchaser was entitled to
the remedy of specific performance. 185 The seller pointed out that the
clickwrap agreement said that it was not.186 Alternatively, the seller
argued that such a remedy was not available in the case under the
UCC. The court expressed some doubt as to whether Article Two of
the UCC would apply, since it did not actually involve a purchase, but
only a license to use.187 Nonetheless, the court decided to at least
examine the license agreement through the lens of the UCC.188 Not-
ing that most states had not adopted UCITA, but that "business per-
sons reasonably expect that some law will govern them," the court
decided to use Article Two, since it was the inspiration for UCITA,
and its provisions "better fulfill those expectations than the common
law.'1 8 9
The court stated that the clickwrap agreement could be analyzed
either as forming a contract under UCC Sec. 2-204 (formation in gen-
eral) or adding terms to an existing agreement under UCC Sec. 2-207
(battle of the forms). 190 "If the proper analysis is pursuant to UCC
Sec. 2-204, the analysis is simple: [the buyer] manifested assent to the
clickwrap license agreement when it clicked on the box stating 'I
agree,' so the agreement is enforceable."' 91 But if UCC Sec. 2-207 is
used, the analysis is more complex. 192
The court then went on to cite both the Step-Saver case and the
ProCD case.193 The court indicated that ProCD was based on UCC
Sec. 2-204, wherein the Seventh Circuit held that the absence of a
182. Id. at 329.
183. Id. at 330.
184. Id.
185. Llan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 331-32.
188. Id. at 332.
189. Id.
190. Llan Sys., 183 F.Supp.2d at 335-336.
191. Id. at 336 (citing Specht. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.
N.Y. 2001).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 337.
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timely rejection by the buyer was sufficient to show assent.194 The
court accepted this doctrine, which it described as "money now, terms
later." 195 The court stated as its reason the UCC's stated goal of al-
lowing for the "continued expansion of commercial practice through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties. ' 196 The court concluded
by saying:
To be sure, shrinkwrap and clickwrap license agreements share the
defect of any standardized contract-they are susceptible to the in-
clusion of terms that border on the unconscionable-but that is not
the issue in this case. The only issue... is whether clickwrap license
agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts, and the
Courts holds that they are.197
In Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC,198 the clickwrap license con-
tained a forum selection clause, stating that all disputes would have to
be resolved in the state of Washington. 199 The court held the agree-
ment enforceable, stating that:
We discern nothing about the style or mode of presentation, or the
placement of the provision, that can be taken as a basis for conclud-
ing that the forum selection clause was proffered unfairly, or with a
design to conceal or de-emphasize its provisions. To conclude that
plaintiffs are not bound by that clause would be equivalent to hold-
ing that they were bound by no other clause either, since all provi-
sions were identically presented.2°°
This case has been widely cited in support of the proposition that
forum selection clauses in clickwrap agreements are enforceable pro-
vided the terms are not unreasonably buried in the fine print.
Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc.201 involved a forum selec-
tion clause that was contained in an "agreement" which totaled thir-
teen pages and could be read through a scroll mechanism on the
computer.20 2 At the top of the agreement was printed the following:
"PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT CARE-
FULLY. ' 20 3 The forum selection clause was in the final section of the
agreement in regular type.20 4 The court held that under these circum-
stances the consumer was given adequate notification of the forum
194. Id.
195. Llan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
199. Id. at 529.
200. Id. at 532.
201. 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002).
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selection clause, and hence the agreement was enforceable. 20 5 The
court stated that "we are not persuaded that notice would have been
sufficient only if the clause was in all capital letters or was placed in
the section entitled 'Limitations of Liability and Remedies' rather
than 'General Provisions.' ")206
In Hughes v. McMenamon,20 7 a multi-page agreement contained a
forum selection clause.20 8 The court stated that "[tihe prevailing view
towards contractual forum-selection clauses is that 'such clauses are
prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown
by the resisting party to be "unreasonable" under the circum-
stances.' "209 "Forum selection clauses of the type used by [American
Online], sometimes referred to as 'clickwrap' agreements, have been
upheld as valid and enforceable. '210
Celmins v. America On Line211 was a per curiam ruling, where the
Florida Court of Appeals held that a forum selection clause in a click-
wrap agreement was enforceable. 212 Arguments relating to unequal
bargaining power and general unconscionability were rejected.213
Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc.214 was another forum selection
clause case. There, the consumer had to scroll through the contract to
read the terms of the agreement, and then click "I agree. ' 215 The
court upheld the forum selection clause. 216 The argument that the
clause was hidden in the agreement was rejected.217
M. A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp.218 involved the
purchase of computer software.219 The purchaser claimed that a de-
fect in the software caused it to submit an inaccurate bid.220 The
plaintiff sued for consequential damages, which were not permitted
according to the shrinkwrap contract.221 In this case the license agree-
205. Id.
206. Forrest, 805 A.2d at 1010-11.
207. 204 F.Supp.2d 178 (D. Mass. 2002).
208. Id. at 180.
209. Id. at 181 (quoting Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 387 (1st Cir.
2001)).
210. Id.
211. 748 So.2d 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
212. Id. at 1041.
213. Id.
214. 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001).
215. Id. at 202.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 203-204.
218. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
219. Id. at 307.
220. Id. at 309.
221. Id. at 316.
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ment was printed on each diskette pouch and the inside cover of the
instruction manual.222 In addition, the first screen that appeared when
the program was used referenced the license.223 The court applied
Article Two to the transaction. 224 In holding that the shrinkwrap con-
tractual provisions were enforceable, the court reasoned that the
purchase order was not intended to be a fully integrated contract. 225
The court pointed to the fact that certain details of the agreement
were not fully outlined, and, in addition, there was no "integration
clause. ' '2 26 Consequently, the shrinkwrap/cickwrap agreements were
deemed to be part of the bargain. 227 The Step Saver case was distin-
guished in two respects: 1) In Step Saver the purchaser had not been
an end user, and had been assured (allegedly) that the license agree-
ment did not apply to him, and 2) In Step Saver the seller had twice
asked the buyer to sign an agreement comparable to their disputed
license agreement, but the buyer refused. 22 8
The court in Morgan Laboratories, Inc. v. Micro Data Base Systems,
Inc. 229 did not enforce the forum selection clause, but its decision was
not based on unequal bargaining power or general unconscionabil-
ity.230 In this case there was a formal license agreement signed by
both parties. 231 That agreement contained language indicating that
any amendments to the agreement had to be signed by both parties.232
The forum selection clause appeared later in the shrinkwrap. 233 Ap-
plying UCC Sec. 2-209 to the transaction, the court held the clause
unenforceable.2 34 The court also rejected the "course of dealing" ar-
gument, stating that this would have required some prior conduct re-
lating to the specific issue in question (forum selection).235 Since this
was the first time this issue had been raised, the course of dealing
doctrine could not be used. 236 There was no discussion of the question
whether or not Article Two should be applied to "license" contracts.
222. Id. at 313.
223. M.A. Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 313.
224. Id. at 310.
225. Id. at 311.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. M.A. Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 312 (citing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939
F.2d 91, 102-103 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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The purchaser of a computer and scanner, in Klocek v. Gateway,
Inc. ,237 brought an action against the seller, alleging that the seller had
made false promises of technical support as well as a failure to notify
the buyer that the scanner was incompatible with certain com-
puters. 238 In the box which contained the equipment the seller had
included a copy of "Standard Terms. '239 At the top of the first page
was a conspicuous notice stating that by keeping the computer beyond
five days the consumer agreed to the terms.2 40 One of the terms re-
quired that all disputes be resolved by arbitration. 241 Applying the
UCC to this transaction, the court noted that "[s]tate courts in Kansas
and Missouri apparently have not decided whether terms received
with a product become part of the parties' agreement. 242
The court also said that "[it appears that at least in part, the cases
turn on whether the court finds that the parties formed their contract
before or after the vendor communicated its terms to the pur-
chaser. ' 243 The court noted that in Hill v. Gateway an arbitration
clause under similar circumstances (except that the time period was 30
days) was upheld.244 However, the court in this case declined to fol-
low the indicated precedent. 245 It gave as its reason its belief that the
cited case did not give adequate consideration to UCC Sec. 2-207.246
Applying the given article, the court noted that since the buyer was
not a merchant additional terms in the seller's acceptance would not
be binding unless and until they were accepted by the buyer.247
Hence, the arbitration clause was not enforceable. 248
The plaintiff in Lively v. Ijam, Inc. ,249 was a resident of Oklahoma
and the defendant corporation was located in Georgia.250 The plain-
tiff purchased a computer from the defendant, and later returned it
for warranty work.251 Not only was the warranty work not completed
by the seller, the computer was never returned to the buyer.25 2 A
237. 104 F.Supp.2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1334.
240. Id. at 1335.
241. Id.
242. Klocek, 104 F.Supp.2d at 1337.
243. Id. at 1338.
244. Id. (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th Cir. 1997)).
245. Id. at 1340.
246. Id. at 1339.
247. Klocek, 104 F.Supp.2d at 1341.
248. Id. at 1342.
249. 114 P.3d 487 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005).
250. Id. at 489.
251. Id. at 490.
252. Id.
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lawsuit was brought in the state of Oklahoma. 253 The defendant
sought a ruling from the trial court that jurisdiction could not be had
in Oklahoma.254 The trial court refused to issue such a ruling and the
defendant appealed.255 On appeal the trial court's ruling was re-
versed.256 The appellate court did not base its decision on the pres-
ence of a forum selection clause. 257 The court's stated reason was that
the forum selection clause only appeared on the back of the invoice,
and "we find that a contract of sale existed between [d]efendants and
Lively [plaintiff] prior to the receipt of the invoice. '258 The Klocek
case was cited with approval.259 However, the appellate court re-
versed and denied personal jurisdiction on the basis of the fact that
the defendant did not have sufficient contacts with the state of
Oklahoma.260 The mere existence of a web site used by Oklahoma
residents was held to be legally insufficient. 261 The court stated that
"[i]f we were to hold that the ability of an out-of-state resident to
access a website was enough to establish jurisdiction, personal juris-
diction could almost always be found in any jurisdiction in the coun-
try." 262 Instead a court should analyze "a foreign business's activity
directed at the state of Oklahoma. '263 As the plaintiffs had failed to
introduce evidence on this issue, personal jurisdiction could not be
found.264
DeJohn v. The. TV Corporation International65 involved a dispute
over a domain name.266 The plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, tried to
purchase a number of domain names for fifty dollars each from the
defendant, The .TV Corporation International. 267 The application
was rejected on the basis of the claim that the price (promoted by the
domain name registrar Register.com, Inc. (also a defendant) was too
253. Id. at 489.
254. Lively, 114 P.3d at 490.
255. Id. at 491.
256. Id. at 499.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 492.
259. Lively, 114 P.3d at 492. As in Klocek, the court noted that if the buyer was not a
merchant he would have to accept the seller's proposed new terms in order for them to be
binding. Id. If both parties were merchants the proposed new terms would still not be part of
the final contract, as the new terms constituted a material change. Id.
260. Id. at 499.
261. Id. at 497.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Lively, 114 P.3d at 497.
265. 245 F.Supp.2d 913 (N.D. I11. 2003).
266. Id. at 914.
267. Id.
2006]
448 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:415
low. 268 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's actions violated cer-
tain deceptive practices acts.269 All of the defendants were non-re-
sidents of the state of Illinois. 270 The plaintiff (and all other
customers) was required to click an icon stating that they agreed to
the terms of the contract described on the web.271 One of the provi-
sions of the contract was a forum selection clause limiting jurisdiction
to the state of New York.272 In upholding the forum selection clause,
the court noted that a party seeking to avoid such a clause must show
that:
(1) it is the result of fraud or overreaching;
(2) the party will be deprived of his day in court as the result of the
"grave inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum;"
(3) the party may be deprived of a remedy due to the "fundamental
unfairness of the chosen law;" or
(4) the clause contravenes a strong public policy of the forum
state.
273
As there was an absence of evidence that any of these factors were
present, the forum selection clause was upheld, and the case was dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction.274
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,275 the plaintiffs
downloaded free software provided by the defendant, but later
claimed that usage of the software resulted in an electronic surveil-
lance in violation of federal law.276 Access to the software was linked
to a license agreement which contained an arbitration clause. 277 The
plaintiff did not wish to be bound to the arbitration requirement, and
brought suit. 278 The court held that the arbitration clause was not le-
gally enforceable. 279 The court described the system employed by
Netscape as "browse-wrap. ' 280 The downloading could be started by
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. DeJohn, 245 F.Supp.2d at 915.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 916.
273. Id. at 921 (citing Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993)).
274. Id. The court also indicated that "because the case can readily address the merits of the
other counts directed at the defendants and has already familiarized itself with them, it will
further judicial efficiency for this court to resolve those claims now instead of transferring this
entire matter to New York." Id. at 921. Among other things, the court dismissed the claims
associated with Illinois consumer fraud claims, as the contract stated that New York law would
govern any dispute associated with the contract. Id. at 922.
275. 150 F.Supp.2d 585 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
276. Id. at 587.
277. Id. at 588.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 596.
280. Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 596.
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clicking on an icon, but the sole reference to the license agreement
was in a text visible only by scrolling down the page.281 The consumer
was told to "[p]lease review and agree to the terms of the Netscape
SmartDownload software license agreement before downloading and
using the software." 282 In refusing to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment, the court stated that under California law the offeree "is not
bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he was una-
ware. '283 In this case the court held that "downloading is hardly an
unambiguous indication of assent. The primary purpose of download-
ing is to obtain a product, not to assent to an agreement. In contrast,
clicking on an icon stating 'I assent' has no meaning or purpose other
than to indicate such assent. ' '284
In Comb v. PayPal, Inc.,285 a United States District Court invali-
dated the arbitration clause that was contained in PayPal's consumer
contract. 286 The court held that the arbitration clause was invalid on
the basis of both procedural and substantive California law.287
Among other things, the court ruled that this was an adhesion con-
tract, and the provision for arbitration was not something that the or-
dinary consumer would expect to be contained in such an
agreement. 288
V. SUMMARY
The tremendous increase in the number of contracts entered into
through electronic means has resulted in a challenge to the legal sys-
tem to ensure that the law applicable to such transactions is both clear
and just - or at least as clear and just as laws applicable to contracts
executed through more traditional means. Towards this end a number
of statutes have been proposed and adopted which are even more pre-
cise that those which have changed through the evolutionary process
of the common law. With regards to judicial decisions involving elec-
tronic contracts, courts have had no trouble applying well known legal
principles to electronic contracts. As stated by the court in Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp.:
281. Id.
282. Id. at 589.
283. Id. at 595 (citing Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal.Rptr. 347 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972)).
284. Id.
285. 218 F.Supp.2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
286. Id. at 1177.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1173
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fPromises become binding when there is a meeting of the minds and
consideration is exchanged. So it was at King's Bench in common
law England; so it was under the common law in the American colo-
nies; so it was through more than two centuries of jurisprudence in
this country; and so it is today. Assent may be registered by a signa-
ture, a handshake, or a click of a computer mouse transmitted
across the invisible ether of the internet.289
While cases applying the uniform statutes which have been promul-
gated by the legislative branch are scarce, there is little doubt that
courts will continue to apply both the statutory law and well estab-
lished legal principles to contracts which are executed through the
electronic universe.
289. 150 F.Supp.2d at 587.
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